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SEPTEMBER 20, 2016
DYLAN MINOR
JAN W. RIVKIN
Truly Human Leadership at Barry-Wehmiller
Ryan Gable had not slept soundly for months. The company that Gable led, Machine Solutions Inc.
(MSI), made equipment that medical device makers used to produce heart catheters. From its founding
in 1999 until 2013, the company had grown to employ 85 people and book annual revenue of $21
million. But in January 2013, MSI lost customers that accounted for a third of its business. By that
September, Gable feared that he would soon have to lay off 20%–25% of his employees. The layoff
decision, difficult under any circumstances, was made even harder by the fact that MSI was a member
of the Barry-Wehmiller family of companies.
To most outside observers in 2013, the Barry-Wehmiller Group appeared to be a maker of industrial
equipment, a provider of engineering consulting services, and an acquirer of manufacturers, with total
revenue of $1.6 billion. But chief executive Bob Chapman defined the company not in terms of its
products, services, and acquisitions but in terms of its “team members,” a phrase Chapman always
used instead of “employees.” “We’re in business so that all our team members can have meaningful
and fulfilling lives. . . . We do that through the building of capital equipment and offering engineering
consulting.”1 Separately, he explained: “I won’t go to my grave proud of the machines I’ve built. I’ll be
proud of the people we built—who we allowed to find their gifts, develop their gifts and be appreciated
for their gifts.”2
With an undergraduate degree in accounting and an MBA, Chapman took a fairly typical approach
to management for the first 30 years of his career. Around 1997, however, he and his corporation started
a journey toward what he termed “Truly Human Leadership,” in which success was measured “by the
way we touch the lives of people.” During that journey, from 1997 to 2013, Barry-Wehmiller grew
revenue at a 14% compounded annual rate and sustained a 16% compounded annual return to its
investors, a level of financial performance few companies achieved over the same period.
In line with Truly Human Leadership, Barry-Wehmiller had gone to great lengths to avoid layoffs
during the recession of 2007–09. Now, in 2013, Ryan Gable had to decide whether to downsize at MSI,
even though it was part of Barry-Wehmiller. The possibility made it hard to sleep.
The Barry-Wehmiller Journey
Origins Barry-Wehmiller traced its roots to a machine shop that Thomas Barry opened in Saint
Louis, Missouri, in 1885. Joined by his innovative brother-in-law Alfred Wehmiller, Barry was soon
selling machines to local breweries like Anheuser-Busch—equipment to wash refillable bottles and
pasteurize beer. Wehmiller’s death in 1917 and the onset of Prohibition in 1919 brought the company
Professor Dylan Minor (Kellogg School of Management) and HBS Professor Jan W. Rivkin prepared this case. Professors Minor and Rivkin
contributed equally and are listed alphabetically. The case was reviewed and approved before publication by a company designate. Funding for
the development of this case was provided by Harvard Business School and not by the company. HBS cases are developed solely as the basis for
class discussion. Cases are not intended to serve as endorsements, sources of primary data, or illustrations of effective or ineffective management.
Copyright © 2016 President and Fellows of Harvard College. To order copies or request permission to reproduce materials, call 1-800-545-7685,
write Harvard Business School Publishing, Boston, MA 02163, or go to www.hbsp.harvard.edu. This publication may not be digitized, photocopied,
or otherwise reproduced, posted, or transmitted, without the permission of Harvard Business School.
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the first of what would be many crises. Barry-Wehmiller struggled through Prohibition, surviving by
selling its equipment overseas where alcohol continued to be sold legally.
In 1953, the family-held company hired Bill Chapman. Chapman succeeded Fred Wehmiller as
president in 1957 and invested $30,000 in the Wehmiller-family-controlled business. With breweries
shifting from returnable bottles to cans and with German competitors on the rise, Barry-Wehmiller
often found itself operating on the edge of the risk its banks would tolerate. Ownership of the
struggling firm passed to Bill Chapman in 1963 when the Wehmiller family was bought out with debt
and Bill Chapman’s $30,000 investment came to represent 57% of the company’s equity. Six years later,
Chapman asked his son Bob to join the business from Price Waterhouse as “someone he could trust.”
Equipped with a CPA degree and a Michigan MBA, Bob moved rapidly through various functional
roles in what he called “my own leadership development program.” This would turn out to be a
significant factor in his development, he reflected, as he learned firsthand the challenges and
interaction of the key business functions. The younger Chapman was running much of the company
as Executive Vice President by 1975, when his father died suddenly of a heart attack.
A young leader’s rollercoaster education At age 30, Bob Chapman found himself atop a
family firm with nearly 400 employees, $18 million in annual revenue, an operating loss of $477,000,
and $2-3 million of secured bank debt. Barry-Wehmiller depended heavily on credit, but the company’s
bankers responded to Bill Chapman’s death by calling in their loans. Bob Chapman recalled:
The combination of my father’s sudden death and the loss of the bank line of credit
motivated me to do whatever it took to cut costs and achieve our budget. For example, I
went to the production supervisor in the plant and asked him, “How many expeditors do
you have?” He said, “Eight.” I said, “We can only have four.” He said, “No. You don’t
understand. We need eight.” I responded, “You don’t understand. I can only afford four.
So we can only have four.” The human cost of this was something I just didn’t think much
about.3
After nine months of what Chapman called “a single-mindedness and intensity that the company
had never experienced before,” Barry-Wehmiller reported a profit of $2.2 million on sales of $22
million, the company’s best year ever.4 Five years of rapid growth followed, as Philip Morris, the
consumer products marketing powerhouse, entered the beer market by acquiring Miller Brewing
Company. An ensuing marketing and market share battle with Anheuser-Busch transformed the
brewing industry. As Anheuser-Busch and Miller expanded quickly, they needed equipment that
Barry-Wehmiller uniquely provided. An ecology movement that favored returnable bottles added to
the company’s organic growth. Barry-Wehmiller’s strong market positon led it to explore new ideas:
solar heating of pasteurizers, new products for bottle inspection, and beverage fillers made under an
Italian licensing agreement. By 1981, Barry-Wehmiller’s revenue soared to $71 million. “Everything I
touched seemed to turn to gold,” Chapman recalled.5
But then, in the early 1980s, the market turned suddenly against the company: growth in beer
consumption faded; Anheuser-Busch and Miller shifted from building new breweries to buying old
ones; technical challenges arose in the innovative businesses; and warranty and inventory issues
surged. Sales fell to $55 million in 1983, and the company lost $5 million. Chapman recalled, “Bankers
who had fully supported the growth initiatives and provided ample credit to support it suddenly
changed their view of the risk and froze Barry-Wehmiller’s credit.” Chapman met frequently with the
firm’s attorney to discuss declaring bankruptcy. In a Harvard Business School case written on the
company in 1989, Chapman explained:
2
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I had to fire a lot of people during that period. I remember one of the analogies one of
the directors shared with me. . . .”When an airplane starts losing altitude and is headed
for the mountains, it is clear that you have to get rid of excess weight to clear the
mountains. . . .” Some individuals couldn’t adjust to this environment and others proved
to be luxuries we couldn’t afford.6
After nine months of day-to-day cash management, the company gained a fragile lease on life in
1983 with a new asset-based loan. Seeking to escape financial troubles, Chapman turned to an unusual
course of action inspired by his study of Emerson Electric’s successful acquisition strategy in mature
markets:
I went to our finance department and said, “We need to start making acquisitions so
we can access markets and technology that can give us a better future.” They looked at
me very professionally and said, “Bob, that is a great idea. We have only one problem.” I
said, “What’s that?” They said, “We have no money. Do you understand that? We have
no money.” I looked at them—this was a defining moment—and said, “Don’t tell me what
we can’t do. I didn’t tell you we needed money. I said we need to do acquisitions.”7
Lacking money, Barry-Wehmiller focused on the only companies that it could consider—ones that
“nobody else wanted.” Chapman recalled:
Given our fragile financial situation, I knew every deal was critical. Fortunately, that
brought about a “must do, can’t fail” attitude and created exceptional learning
opportunities because I was fully engaged in every deal. In 1986, given the continuing
challenges of the core business, the U.K. team surfaced a remote idea of spinning off the
U.K.-led part of Barry-Wehmiller on the London Stock Exchange. If successful, this would
allow us to pay off our asset-based debt, have $2 million in the bank, retain our legacy
business of equipment for the brewing industry, and own 30% of a publicly traded U.K.
company. While the idea seemed extremely remote, our team shifted its focus to meeting
the criteria for a successful flotation.
To Chapman’s surprise, the spinoff’s initial public offering was 35 times oversubscribed. The
flotation left Barry-Wehmiller with $28 million in cash, a 30% stake in a U.K. public company, and, at
last, some liquidity.
An acquisition strategy emerges
Chapman reflected:
My learning from this sequence of experiences was that you can create value in mature
markets by seeing value where others don’t and being open to developing and
implementing unique strategies for value creation. We didn’t get to this outcome by
traditional thinking; the precariousness of our financial situation created the motivation
for unconventional thinking and led to an outcome beyond anyone’s imagination.8
In 1988, with the opportunity to “suit up one more time,” our team stepped back and
reflected on the dramatic growth, traumatic decline, and unexpected outcome of a wildly
successful IPO. We considered our mistakes and learnings and articulated a “Strategy for
Growth, Value and Liquidity.” The strategy called on Barry-Wehmiller to grow by
selectively acquiring equipment makers that fit our competencies and created a balance
among the markets we served, to reduce the risk from being overly dependent on a single
market or technology. Pausing to capture our learnings and integrate these unique
3
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Truly Human Leadership at Barry-Wehmiller
experiences into the design of a business model created the foundation for us to grow
from $20 million to $1.6 billion.
Tim Sullivan, director for corporate development in 1989 and group president by 2000, explained:
Many of our companies have large aftermarket product lines that typically don’t get the
attention of traditional business leaders. When searching for companies to buy, we looked
for businesses with large bases of installed equipment as our experience was that these
income streams were more resilient and predictable in the capital equipment investment
cycles and would reduce the cyclical nature of capital spending. In every company we
considered buying, senior management said, “Oh yes, our aftermarket products are a very
important aspect of the business.” But some of them couldn’t even remember the names of
the team members who handled these products. Whenever we sensed this lack of
leadership attention, we knew we had a promising acquisition target.9
Epiphanies Execution of this strategy resulted in significant growth (Exhibit 1). At the
beginning of this growth period, the company took a conventional approach to its team members.
Starting around 1997, however, Chapman had three epiphanies that led toward “Truly Human
Leadership.” Chapman described the first:
I’d bought a company in South Carolina and flew down there to be there on the first
day that I owned it. It was March of 1997, and you know what happens in every office
around this country in March: March Madness. I walked in a little before the office opened
and everybody was talking about their basketball team. They were having fun. But the
closer it got to 8 o’clock when the office opened, you could see the joy go out of their
body.10
Asking himself “Why can’t work be fun?” Chapman proposed a game: whoever sold the most parts
in a week would win a small cash prize, and if the team made its goal for the week, everybody would
get a monetary team award. Within the first quarter, sales were up more than 20%. “When people
started having fun in their roles, we saw transformation in their customer service skills,” Chapman
observed.11
A second awakening came in church:
My mentor, Ed [Salmon], was the rector of our church, and I was always in awe that
he could stand up each week in church and inspire us. I realized on Sunday that Ed only
had us for an hour a week, and we have people in our care for 40 hours a week. I realized
the significant impact we could have on people’s lives. I understood that day that business
could be the most powerful force for good if it could only accept the profound
responsibility it has for impacting the lives of people who work in organizations.12
A third epiphany came at a wedding, as Chapman watched a close friend escort his daughter down
the aisle. “It occurred to me, ‘Everybody that works for us is somebody’s precious child, and we have
a chance to profoundly impact their lives.’”13
Guiding Principles of Leadership These moments came to a head in 2002. Chapman was
producing a video for internal distribution, and the marketing team leader asked him to talk about the
company’s success in traditional financial terms. Chapman ignored the financial metrics and replied,
“We are going to measure success by the way we touch the lives of people.” A few weeks later, the
company convened a cross-section of 20 leaders in Florida. Chapman and Chief People Officer Rhonda
4
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Spencer challenged the group to construct a statement of Barry-Wehmiller’s approach to leadership.
The result, the Guiding Principles of Leadership (GPL), started with and elaborated on Chapman’s
definition of success (Exhibit 2).
Soon afterward, a division president sent Spencer the values statement of Enron, the scandal-ridden
and discredited energy-trading company (Exhibit 3). In some ways, Enron’s statement resembled
Barry-Wehmiller’s Guiding Principles. Spencer challenged Chapman about the GPL: “How is this not
just going to be something that’s on the walls?”14
Chapman’s reply was that they were going to place these values in their team members heads and
hearts, and he subsequently started a series of in-person dialogues with “team members” (no longer
called “employees”) across the organization—showing them the GPL and asking, “This is what we
believe. What does this mean to you? What are we doing that doesn’t match up to what we say here?”15
Mismatches were addressed rapidly: for instance, time clocks and inventory cages that signified
mistrust were removed quickly, often over the objections of middle management. Chapman estimated
that he devoted 25% of his time to such dialogues. In subsequent years, recognition programs were
established to honor team members who acted in the spirit of the GPL, and Barry-Wehmiller University
was set up, in part to convey the GPL. (See more below.)
The Great Recession
The staggering economic downturn of 2007–09 put Barry-Wehmiller’s
GPL to the test. In 2009, the company saw a 35% downturn in new equipment orders, and the company’s
backlog declined rapidly as customers canceled orders. Chapman was visiting a subsidiary in Italy when
word arrived that a major order was being put on hold. Layoffs seemed inevitable. He recalled:
Beyond the impact on our culture, if we let people go in that brutal economic
environment, it would devastate them and their families and even some communities.
There were simply no other jobs to be had. Many people would lose their homes, some
their marriages. Children would have to drop out of college. The human toll was almost
too painful to contemplate. . . .
I asked myself, “What would a caring family do when faced with such a crisis?” The
answer soon came to me: All the family members would absorb some pain so that no
member of the family had to experience dramatic loss.16
Ten days later, Barry-Wehmiller’s leadership team rolled out a program of shared sacrifice. There
would be no layoffs. Instead, each team member was instructed to take an unpaid furlough for four
weeks at a time of his or her choosing. All team members were given a furlough, even those in divisions
that were faring relatively well. The company suspended executive bonuses, stopped its program of
matching personal contributions to 401(k) retirement accounts, offered generous payments to team
members who agreed to retire early, and ordered reductions in travel expenses. Chapman cut his salary
from $875,000 to $10,500, the amount he earned decades earlier as a first-year CPA. Education and
recognition programs continued, albeit with some cost-cutting.
Management heard only positive reactions to the furlough program. Some team members stepped
up to take extra time off on behalf of colleagues who couldn’t afford unpaid furloughs. Unions agreed
quickly to the program.
The company rallied from the Great Recession faster than expected and reported record financial
results in 2010. Barry-Wehmiller marked the strong results by paying team members extra to cover any
401(k) matching contributions that were lost during the downturn. Chapman reflected:
5
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The 2008–2009 global financial crisis was a traumatic experience for most companies.
It started out that way for us as well. But because we had our deeply rooted Guiding
Principles of Leadership in place, and because we indeed do measure success by the way
we touch the lives of people, our way forward became quite clear to us early on. Because
of the way we chose to respond, the financial crisis actually ended up being a blessing in
disguise for us.17
Barry-Wehmiller in 2013
Having weathered the Great Recession, Barry-Wehmiller continued to grow: revenue rose from $1.2
billion in 2008 to $1.6 billion in 2013. The company’s stock, which was privately held (see below),
appreciated at an annual rate of 16% over the same period. Total employment had grown to 8,000 by
2013. See Exhibit 1 for a summary of financial and other results.
Organization and ownership Barry-Wehmiller operated the ten divisions shown in Exhibit 4.
The divisions, in turn, were organized around four sectors, or “platforms”: packaging automation
equipment, converting equipment, paper systems equipment, and engineering & IT consulting.
Divisions had considerable autonomy, and the corporate staff in St. Louis was small.
The descendants of Bill Chapman, Bob Chapman’s father, owned 64% of Barry-Wehmiller.
Remaining equity was held by current employees (10%), active directors (6%), retired and former
employees (4%), and a select set of outside investors (16%). The company made a private market in its
stock. Twice a year, the corporate finance team calculated a stock price for the company using Stern,
Stewart’s Economic Value Added methodology: future cash flows were projected based on estimates
from operating managers; the cash flows were discounted back to the present using a weighted average
cost of capital and summed up; the value of debt was deducted in order to estimate the value of all
equity; and that value was divided by the number of shares outstanding. Exhibit 1 includes Barry
Wehmiller’s stock price over time.
People practices Chief People Officer Rhonda Spencer summed up the company’s human
resources approach: “The Barry-Wehmiller way is profit and people in harmony.”18 Recognition
programs highlighted the contributions of outstanding team members. For instance, the Guiding
Principles of Leadership SSR Award, available to workers at corporate headquarters and in most
business units, recognized those who furthered Barry-Wehmiller’s vision of measuring success by how
they “touch the lives of others.” Team members could nominate a colleague for the SSR award, and a
committee interviewed nominees before selecting a winner. Originally, the winner received a bright
yellow Chevrolet SSR, a flashy retro convertible pickup truck, to drive for a week. The program grew
to include a broader set of cars and a formal celebration of the winner. In addition, the company sent
the winner’s family a letter telling them of the person’s “goodness” at work.
Barry-Wehmiller supported health among its team members through its Vision of Wellbeing
program (Exhibit 5). The company gave team members financial incentives to complete an array of
free wellbeing and health screenings and offered “behavior-change tools” to help team members
respond to any risks identified in the screenings. When initially implemented, the program inspired
team members to take better care of themselves and identify health issues earlier—thereby contributing
to a 5% reduction in health care costs. In response, Barry-Wehmiller gave team members a month off
from paying their health care premiums. In addition—reported Laurie Ferrendelli, Director of
Organizational Development—the new screenings allowed at least seven team members to identify
and address life-threatening conditions.
6
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The industrial context of Barry-Wehmiller made safety a particularly important issue. The company
encouraged team members to “make sure our friends stay out of harm’s way” and embrace the Safety
Covenant (Exhibit 5). Locations that demonstrated 12 continuous months without an incident were
awarded the Corporate Safety Covenant Award.
Barry-Wehmiller University (BWU), founded in 2008, gave team members an opportunity to
become steeped in the Barry-Wehmiller way. This internal program provided a variety of courses on
leadership, which were made available to all team members, not just managers. Its flagship offering,
Communications Skills Training, was largely a course on becoming a good listener; Bob Chapman
contended that “listening is fundamental to Truly Human Leadership skills.”19 Faculty for the
University were always team members from within Barry-Wehmiller. Overall, the BWU courses were
designed to help team members grow in what the organization identified as the 12 key attributes of
leadership. Participation in any University course was voluntary but required an application. The
University received about three applications for every available seat.
Underlying BWU was a vision Bob Chapman described as “building a better world through
business”—a phrase that was added to the company name as a tagline. Consistent with improving the
world at large, Barry-Wehmiller began in 2011 to offer its flagship course on communication to external
companies and continued to expand its course offerings for outsiders. Courses offered to outside
companies were taught by the same Barry-Wehmiller faculty who taught internally.
More broadly, Barry-Wehmiller placed high priority on cross-training team members so that
workers could shift among projects and tasks if the needs of the organization changed.
Another initiative that Barry-Wehmiller managers considered essential was L3. The L3 approach was
inspired by Toyota’s famous Lean methodology, which sought to eliminate waste from an organization
in order to maximize its productivity and efficiency. One team member, Jake Huskey, explained how
L3 differed from the Lean approach adopted at most other companies:
Traditionally, the Lean methodology seeks to eliminate all waste, where waste is often
people. However, with L3, waste elimination is frustration elimination. We ask people
what is frustrating them in their work. And then we try to help them remove the
frustration so that they are freed to accomplish more.
Compensation at Barry-Wehmiller was typically at market rates. As the Guiding Principles of
Leadership put it, the company’s policy was to “treat people superbly and pay them fairly.” The
company did not collect systematic data on employee satisfaction. Instead, senior managers arranged
“listening sessions” where groups of team members met with facilitators who asked how things were
going, what the company did well, what it could do better, and so on. People Team leaders reviewed
notes from the listening sessions and made adjustments to programs, teams, and environments.
Overall, leaders felt morale was high, and they could relate the stories of individual team members
whose lives the company had improved.
Acquisitions By late 2013, Barry-Wehmiller had completed a total of 60 acquisitions in its
history. Barry-Wehmiller usually bought companies that were challenged in terms of finances and
people practices, in markets complementary to its existing portfolio but still offering some
diversification benefit. A typical firm had 25-100 employees, and most sold equipment to industrial
customers—they “made things that made things”—and consequently saw large swings in demand
over the business cycle. The typical acquiree’s competitors were mostly in North America and Europe,
though rivals from Asia were becoming more common as Asian product quality improved. Ideally, an
7
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acquiree had a large installed base of buyers who required regular interaction with customer service—
for instance, to acquire aftermarket services.
Over time, Barry-Wehmiller institutionalized its processes for seeking and vetting companies:
Group president Tim Sullivan created a formal model that grew to become an important part of the
acquisition selection process. Bob Chapman and Tim Sullivan made the final decision on new
acquisitions. A board of directors also provided nonbinding advice on acquisitions and on strategic
decisions more broadly.
Many acquired companies had been family owned, and some sought to be acquired by BarryWehmiller rather than another buyer. Barry-Wehmiller generally avoided bidding wars and declined
to pursue firms also being targeted by private equity firms. For about one-third of its acquisitions,
Barry-Wehmiller was the only bidder.
Once an acquisition was consummated, Barry-Wehmiller strove to have a “span of care rather than
a span of control.” Every new acquisition was introduced to the people practices of Barry-Wehmiller:
L3 and Barry-Wehmiller University were integral parts of a successful acquisition process, Sullivan
reported. Rather than replacing the management of the purchased company, Barry-Wehmiller
attempted to convert those individuals to the Barry-Wehmiller way.
Improving the customer service of a recent acquisition was a big focus. Sullivan explained that “an
engaged and motivated associate will respond to and engage customers at a whole new level.”20
Motivational games inspired better relationships, greater attention to customer needs, and an overall
improvement in the level of service. A critical component of this enriched customer service was
decreasing the turnaround time from when a customer requested a quote on an after-market part to
when the quote was delivered. After-market parts had margins of about 50% versus 10%–15% for new
equipment.
Barry-Wehmiller aimed to retain and grow acquired companies indefinitely. None of the company’s
acquisitions had been divested since the U.K. spinoff in 1986.
The PCMC acquisition Management pointed to the 2006 acquisition of Paper Converting
Machinery Company (PCMC) as a successful example of Barry-Wehmiller’s approach. Founded in
1919 in Green Bay, Wisconsin, and long family-owned, PCMC made and sold equipment that
converted paper from one form to another. One of its products, for instance, took giant spools of tissue
paper and produced individual toilet paper rolls. By 2006, PCMC was reeling under competitive
pressure: revenue had fallen from $250 million to $169 million in five years. Despite restructuring
attempts, the company had lost money in five of the prior six years, including an earnings before
interest, taxes, depreciation, and amortization (EBITDA) loss of $20 million in 2005.
When acquiring PCMC, Barry-Wehmiller decided to offer employment to 1,012 of PCMC’s 1,150
employees. Among the individuals not offered a job were a handful of highly compensated past
leaders. Instead, Barry-Wehmiller promoted a few PCMC veterans with a “passion for success” to lead
the new division. The new leader of the customer service function was given more authority and
responsibility, while engineering and manufacturing—two functions that had been “warring
factions”—were combined into a single team. In the short run, the division focused on improving
delivery times, reflecting a belief that improvements on that dimension would send a powerful positive
signal to customers.
In the medium term, the new PCMC leadership team diversified the division away from three big
customers and focused sales efforts on parts, service, and equipment upgrades. A small division in
8
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Brazil, where prior management had sought low-cost labor, was moved back to Green Bay in order to
increase capacity utilization there. The resulting message that “we can pay people fairly and compete
globally” from Wisconsin helped management build a new, more productive relationship with union
leaders in Green Bay. A modest Italian subsidiary of PCMC, which under old ownership had begun to
compete for PCMC’s U.S. customers, was steered to focus exclusively on European customers. New
investments broadened the division’s product range.
Barry-Wehmiller’s leaders acknowledged that luck played a factor in the PCMC success: right after
the acquisition closed, a customer signed a two-year, $61 million contract. Even beyond that contract,
however, PCMC enjoyed financial success (Exhibit 6). The company’s $45 million investment paid back
in two years, and improved labor relations bore fruit in 2009 when the union readily agreed to BarryWehmiller’s furlough plan.
Exhibit 7 breaks down how PCMC moved from negative $20 million EBITDA in 2005 to positive
$30 million EBITDA in 2006. As shown there, Barry-Wehmiller finance executives estimated that of the
$50 million turnaround, $6 million was due to idiosyncratic and nonrecurring expenses that PCMC
had incurred in 2005; $23 million was attributable to actions that any good management team could
undertake; and $21 million could be ascribed to Barry-Wehmiller and its unique operating model. Of
particular importance were increased revenues from a more motivated salesforce, value pricing for
equipment and services, and the fact that Barry-Wehmiller operated PCMC with fewer team members.
Forsyth Capital Investors
Based on his external board experience, Chapman believed that:
The Barry-Wehmiller value drivers—for instance, our sales incentive programs, our
market pricing, our intense focus on cash management, our recognition and celebration
programs, and inspirational leadership—could be applied to companies outside of the
platforms in our current portfolio. Expanding beyond the current equipment markets
would also enhance the “balance” of markets served.
To test this belief, Barry-Wehmiller formed and funded Forsyth Capital Investors (FCI) in January
2009. As Chapman put it, FCI took a “hybrid equity” approach, combining “some of the creative
structures and alignment of ownership that you find in the private equity market” with “the value of
the strategic buyer that brings operational skills sets” and “a long-term commitment with ‘no flip’ in
the equation.” The Barry-Wehmiller platforms were “largely centered on equipment and engineering
solutions for industries such as packaging, paper/film converting, and corrugating.”21 In contrast,
Forsyth was set up to create new business platforms, starting in printing equipment, insurance services,
and medical device equipment. By late 2013, FCI had put together a portfolio of five companies worth
$150 million.
The Downturn at Machine Solutions Inc.
Within the portfolio of Forsyth Capital Investors was Machine Solutions Inc. (MSI), and leading MSI
was Ryan Gable. Gable had graduated from college in 1999 and had spent ten years in the investment
banking and private equity divisions of Bank of America. “I loved the buy-side of private equity,”
Gable said, “but I always wanted more of an operational experience and less of a transactional
experience.”22 Gable joined Barry-Wehmiller to help set up FCI in 2009, just as the Great Recession was
in full swing. One of his first assignments was to build a financial model to analyze the downturn and
Barry-Wehmiller’s possible responses. The model helped the senior team choose company-wide
furloughs over layoffs during the 2009 crisis.
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This document is authorized for use only by Yunqi Zhu in MGMT3380_LEAD_LIAO_22S taught by Zhenyu Liao, Washington University in St. Louis from Dec 2021 to Jun 2022.
For the exclusive use of Y. Zhu, 2022.
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Truly Human Leadership at Barry-Wehmiller
The market and the company In November 2011, Forsyth acquired 80% of MSI. Founded in
1999, MSI sold equipment that medical device giants such as Boston Scientific, Medtronic, and Bard
used in their heart-catheter production lines. Catheters were long, flexible tubes. To open up a
narrowed blood vessel in a patient’s heart, cardiac surgeons would thread a catheter from an artery in
a patient’s groin into his or her heart, then inflate a balloon and insert a stent. The process of attaching
balloons, stents, and other items to catheters had been mostly a manual process until MSI invented
machines to fold balloons, crimp stents, and swage (or shape) the associated metal parts. By 2013, MSI
made machines that automated seven or eight of the 10-12 steps in a catheter production line. Each
machine was tabletop-sized and sold for $50,000 to $250,000.
Before an MSI customer such as Medtronic could open a new production line for catheters, the line
had to be validated by a regulator, the Federal Drug Administration. Once the line was validated, it
was difficult for the catheter maker to switch among equipment vendors; if a machine broke down, it
was much easier to go back to the same machine maker rather than to switch vendors and revalidate
the line. If a catheter maker wanted to increase production capacity, the easiest way to get validation
for a new production lines was to make it identical to old lines.
After pioneering the market for catheter production equipment around 1999, MSI faced no
competition for its first several years. In 2013, MSI was still the largest in its business—with $21 million
in revenue within a global market of about $100 million. The rest of the industry was served by a large
array of competitors, each with $2-10 million in sales and most founded in the last decade.
Located in Flagstaff, Arizona—far from other Barry-Wehmiller operations—MSI employed 85
people in 2013. The team manufactured half of its parts, including all proprietary parts, in an extensive
machine shop, then completed mechanical and electrical assembly of its machines. New equipment
sales and aftermarket sales and service accounted for 75% and 25% of revenue, respectively. Gable
described the MSI team as young, driven, and energetic. Though part of Barry-Wehmiller for less than
two years, members of the team had attended BWU classes and adopted much of the Barry-Wehmiller
culture, including wide use of recognition programs. The company was run with an “open book”:
management shared financial results every month.
Tough times The financial results for MSI’s first 14 months with Barry-Wehmiller—through the
end of 2012—were promising. Annual revenue rose by $1 million as the company added sales and
service staff.
But then in the first quarter of 2013, MSI’s new equipment demand dropped by 33%. About half of
the decline was due to the company’s largest customer: a catheter maker that had purchased $4-5
million of equipment each year was now on a pace to buy only $1 million. The reduction, Gable
believed, was “not because we had ticked them off” but simply because the customer itself was
growing less rapidly. Demand from other customers was also down sharply, even though the economy
as a whole was gaining strength. Some observers blamed the decline on a new U.S. excise tax on
medical devices, but the 2.3% tax seemed too small to cause a marked fall in device production.
Because each Forsyth Capital company was capitalized separately, MSI had its own cash reserves
and loans. In March 2013, MSI’s senior team projected its financials: on the current trajectory, MSI
would lose $1 million in the second quarter, resort to a revolving line of credit in April, and break loan
covenants in June. MSI’s management team considered short-term emergency measures: by moving to
a four-day work week, cutting leaders’ pay b