University of the Cumberlands
School of Computer & Information Sciences
ISOL-536 – Security Architecture & Design
Chapter 10: Mobile Security Software
with Cloud Management
Chapter 10: Mobile Security Software with
Cloud Management
• 10.1 Basic Mobile Security Architecture
• 10.2 Mobility Often Implies Client/Cloud
• 10.3 Introducing Clouds
• 10.3.1 Authentication Is Not a Panacea
• 10.3.2 The Entire Message Stack Is Important
• 10.4 Just Good Enough Security
• 10.5 Additional Security Requirements for a Mobile and Cloud
Architecture
Chapter 10: Mobile Security Software with
Cloud Management
• In order to examine yet another architectural pattern, this example mobile
security product will make use of cloud-based management software and a
Software as a Service (SaaS) “reputation” service.
10.1 Basic Mobile Security Architecture
• Figure 10.1 presents the architecture for a hypothetical
mobile security protection system. Many of the components
are the same in the two endpoint security architectures.
Incoming and outbound communications have to be
established and maintained. An engine must process system
events and examine possibly malicious data items.
Figure 10.1 Mobile security software.
10.2 Mobility Often Implies Client/Cloud
• A reputation service is so-called because many behavioral data points are kept about a particular URL, file,
or Internet Protocol (IP) Address. Data is collected from various sources about the observed behavior of the
object for which reputation is being calculated. A URL (or other object) will fall somewhere in a continuum
from absolutely malicious to reputable (good), with various degrees of “gray” in between those two poles.
Based upon the reputation rating, software can prevent access, present the problem for user decision, or
passively allow the access.
• Although it may not be apparent when looking at mobile devices, they do have permanent storage. Files are
kept on the device’s permanent storage. Applications create files. Applications manipulate files. Device users
view and edit files. Indeed, on the device’s storage, a typical operating system directory structure does, in
fact, exist. There is a “tree” of directories (“folders”) that is exactly what you would find on your computer
or your laptop, regardless of which of the usual operating systems you use. On many mobile operating
systems, the file and directory details are hidden from the user. Most of these operating systems assume
that there is but a single user who has access to all the files. Since mobile operating systems highlight
application functionality, the details of file access are hidden behind application user interfaces.
10.2 Mobility Often Implies Client/Cloud –
Cont.
Figure 10.2 Mobile security software with cloud management.
• In at least a couple of mobile platforms, no application may
install software into the kernel. As was noted in Chapter 3, the
“system” area exists between the application mode and the
kernel. There are three layers—application, system, and kernel
(in Figures 10.1 and 10.2, the kernel is not diagrammed, as it is
not relevant to this architecture). For our purposes, the security
issues are approximately the same regardless of whether
Intercept exists as a part of the operating system or whether it
was written and installed with the application. If the intercept
service is “native”—that is, a part of the operating system—
obviously its secure coding and assurance is not under the
control of the mobile software maker. Still, the design issues are
analogous.
Figure 10.2 Mobile security software with cloud management.
10.3 Introducing Clouds
• Communications from each endpoint must flow across the untrusted Internet. Any number of networks and
Internet providers may be crossed as packets are routed. Hence, in Figure 10.2, the arrow from the
communicator reaches into the Internet, whereas disconnected arrows move to the cloud-based services.
The disconnect between arrows is to indicate the unknown nature of routing, the unknown networks across
which the traffic must pass.
• Usually, the commercial services are “cloud” grade. That is, the services are available across the globe so
that user access time is reduced. The services are always available, with failover systems that can pick up
upon an instance failure. Cloud services are usually redundant and backed up to various points of presence
spread out geographically so that a local catastrophe cannot bring the service down. (We will take a look at
the backend architecture of a cloud service in the next analysis.)
• One of the big challenges with cloud-based reputation checks is performance. Users don’t typically want to
wait a few seconds while the reputation of potential URLs is checked. Most of us have come to expect that
websites are at the immediate tips of our fingers and that access and loading of the content should take
place rapidly and without delay. This presents a tricky security problem.
10.3.1 Authentication Is Not a Panacea
• Should the application be the entity that authenticates? Or should it be the device? Again, there are
arguments back and forth about this design choice, which we won’t go into in this example. There are
strong reasons for authenticating the device. And that’s the pattern that this system employs. If it’s the
device that’s under management, even if the software breaks down, the management service has some
concept of the device itself. If the device is lost, it can contain an identifier, regardless of whether the
software on it has been reset by a thief. The mobile carrier interacts with the device; the management
service, which is able to identify the device, may interact with the carrier about the device, if necessary.
Both the management services and the reputation service authenticate the device, not the user. I reiterate
that, in general, mobile operating systems and architectures assume a single user per device.
• Should the communicator authenticate the server? TLS is being used from the device to the server. TLS
always validates the server certificate before proceeding. However, that authentication typically only
validates that the certificate was issued by a known Certificate Authority and that the certificate is valid for
the IP address of the server. In other words, any TLS server that has a valid certificate will successfully pass
the server side TLS authentication. What if our mobility security software gets directed through DNS
spoofing to a malicious site? And what if that malicious site presents a valid certificate?
10.4 Just Good Enough Security
• Depending upon the adversaries against whom you are protecting the device, “good enough” might well be
a reliance upon the message’s digital signature alone. Alternatively, for high-security situations that require
more assurance, the addition of a validation of the TLS certificate itself could be added. In addition to
validating the certificate authority signing chain, also validate the certificate that is presented by the server.
Make it difficult to impersonate the reputation server. There is no “right” answer to this question. It
depends upon the security needs of the organization and how much risk can be tolerated.
10.4 Just Good Enough Security – Cont.
Figure 10.3 Cloud-hosted mobile device management using the
Hardware Security Module (HSM).
• How do you protect a secret like a private key? The addition
of a Hardware Security Module (HSM) can help to protect
the private key that will sign each device certificate and all
the messages from the management function to the devices
(as specified above). But HSM’s are not a panacea, just like
the use of TLS is not a security cure-all. Deploying an HSM
requires some forethought and architecture.
Figure 10.3 Cloud-hosted mobile device management using the Hardware
Security Module (HSM).
10.4 Just Good Enough Security – Cont.
Here is the order of processing:
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
The user enrolls the security application.
The user enrolls a particular device.
A device identifier is generated (must include sufficient entropy to be unpredictable).
A certificate request is generated for the device identifier on behalf of the device.
The certificate request is sent to the HSM.
A signed certificate is returned. The public key of the signing key pair will be included in the certificate.
A device certificate for that particular device identifier is returned for installation on the device.
The device can use the public key to verify the certificate signature.
After enrollment, communications from the device may not proceed before the signature over the
device certificate has been verified. This can be done by comparison against a duplicate of the public
key, which is kept within the directory copy maintained within the authentication system’s restricted
subnet. No communication to the HSM is required in order to validate the certificate. The duplicate
public key does not require additional, extraordinary protections.
10.5 Additional Security Requirements for a
Mobile and Cloud Architecture
The following comprise the additional requirements that must be added to those for an endpoint anti-malware
application.
• Use TLS between the mobile device and cloud services. Server-side TLS authentication is required.
• Each enrolled device will be issued a device identifier. Device identifiers must be unpredictable.
• Generate and install a certificate on each mobile device under management. The certificate must be unique to
each device. Certificate signature must be validated before cloud services may be accessed. The private key used to
sign the device certificate must not be deployed to any device. A single private key may be used for all devices. A
better design generates a private signing key for each customer, although consumers who individually purchase
protection may all have their certificates signed by the same private key.
• The private key used to sign the device certificate must be stored in an HSM or equivalent. The network must be
configured such that the HSM will only accept cryptographic operations from the enrollment and management
service.
• All data (commands, reputations, policies, configurations, etc.) and all binaries downloaded to devices must be
hashed and signed. The device software will validate the signature and the hash before any further processing.
Chapter 10: Summary
• One of the big challenges with cloud-based reputation checks is performance. Users don’t typically want to
wait a few seconds while the reputation of potential URLs is checked. Most of us have come to expect that
websites are at the immediate tips of our fingers and that access and loading of the content should take
place rapidly and without delay. This presents a tricky security problem.
• As we have seen, security decisions must be based on the objectives that are to be fulfilled by the security.
Chapter 10: Summary
END
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