Trident University International IC and LE Integration Discussion

Discussion Requirements

Active participation in all discussions is required.

Post comments at least 3 times during each module.

Before writing your comments:

Review the Discussion grading rubric to see what is expected for an excellent discussion, in order to earn full credit.

Review some resources to help you synthesize, such as the following:

Sullivan, J. (2011). Strategies for Synthesis Writing. Retrieved from http://www.findingdulcinea.com/features/edu/Strategies-for-Synthesis-Writing.html

Second post for each module discussion:

A substantive comment should be approximately 300 words or more for all responses.

Read the initial comments posted by your classmates and reflect upon them.

Formulate one new comment of your own. It must be a logical and thoughtful response that synthesizes the comments of at least 3 classmates into one comment. Be sure to synthesize; do not simply reply to each of the 3 classmates or restate their comments

NOTE: You are required to cite sources and include a reference list for the second post if it is simply your opinion. However, if your opinion is based on facts (as it should be), it is good practice to strengthen your position by citing sources.

Be sure to meet all of the criteria in the rubric, as noted in the instructions above.

Third post for each module discussion:

Read the initial and secondary comments posted by your classmates and reflect upon them.

Directly respond to at least one classmate in a way that extends meaningful discussions, adds new information, and/or offers alternative perspectives.

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MY DISCUSSION

Classmates and Professor,

The Intelligence Community and the Local Law Enforcement have yet to develop and implement proper information-sharing strategies. In a report by Kredo (2013), Boston law enforcement and counterterrorism officials admitted that if the FBI and federal authorities had shared critical, intelligent information about the Boston Marathon bombers, then perhaps it would have prevented the deadly terror attack from occurring. According to the authors, if the local law enforcers had been alerted of the Tsarnaev brother’s potential threat, they would have beefed the security up a notch to tackle the threat.

Conversely, in a report entitled LEAP, it discusses how September 11, 2001, the terrorist attack could have been predicted if different law enforcement bodies would have been engaged. For instance, homeland security should engage State, local, and tribal law enforcement officers in the fight against terrorism. The report states that these individuals are best positioned to observe signs of terrorism at different levels. Thus sharing such information can prove detrimental to the efforts of thwarting terrorist attacks. Carter (2006) shares a similar opinion, stating that ensuring the United States’ protection from threats, cooperation between federal, states, local, and tribal levels of security should embrace a culture of sharing information. Carter sensitizes that every law agency in the United States, despite its size, should have the capacity to collect, analyze, and share critical, intelligent information, which could be beneficial in the fight against terrorism.

Boston has been on the front line of ensuring information sharing within its law enforcement groups. Seeing that the Boston Marathon attack would have been avoided or prevented if crucial information was shared regarding suspected terrorists, the State has improved its measures of ensuring information is shared through the Joint Terrorism Task Force JTTF. The Boston JTTF advocate for the fair sharing of sensitive information to uphold the people’s safety and the country as a whole.

One recommendation that I would give the Intelligent Community is to promote as much information sharing as possible. All the different law enforcement agencies should collaborate to identify threats from various security levels, including remote areas, rural regions, and urban cities. Such collaboration can effectively ensure a safer country and quick identification of potential terrorists. Each agency should have an organized intelligence center where officers can report suspicious activity or persons, which can be shared with the intelligence community for further investigation or verification. Additionally, the IC can share crucial information to the intelligent centers for all the security agencies to be alert and keep vigil in tracking or identifying potential attackers.

Pedro

Reference:

Carter, D.L. (2006). Law enforcement intelligence: A guide for state, local, and tribal law enforcement agencies. Washington, D.C.: U.S. Department of Justice Office of Community Oriented Policing Services. Retrieved from 050919201-IntelGuide_web.pdf” target=”_blank”>050919201-IntelGuide_web.pdf”>https://it.ojp.gov/documents/d/e050919201-IntelGui…

Kredo, A. (2013). Failure to communicate: Intelligence sharing could have helped prevent Boston marathon bombing. The Washington Free Beacon. Retrieved from http://freebeacon.com/national-security/failure-to…

N.A. (2009). LEAP: Law Enforcement Assistance and Partnership Strategy. Washington, DC: Office of Congressman Bennie Thompson. Retrieved from http://epic.org/privacy/fusion/leap.pdf

The Organization for security and Co-Operation in Europe (OSCE). (2018, September 3). Intelligence-Led Policing – From Reaction to Prevention. Retrieved from YouTube:

RESPONSE 1

Green Module 3 Post 1 – IC and LE Integration

Good Evening Class,

At this point in my journey towards this degree, I have discussed the rocky relationship between law enforcement (LE) and the intelligence community (IC). This rocky relationship was realized, at the national level, after the attacks of 9/11. Intelligence-led policing has increased substantially in the past 20 years; the widespread use of information systems and various dissemination mechanisms have allowed the timely and accurate flow of information from national, regional, and local data exchanges (ODNI, n.d.). Despite these steps in the right direction, there are still roadblocks, which need to be solved.

I will admit finding truthful and unbiased information on this subject is a bit tough; people and leaders don’t want to point out what they are doing/implementing poorly. But, in Scott Bransford’s dissertation, he sheds light on some of the issues which may contribute to these roadblocks. He argues that several challenges exist and begin with the overall strategy information sharing strategy. We tend to think about information sharing from a “top-down” approach. Instead, he argues we must receive buy-off from the average rank-and-file officers and begin to look at this problem from a “bottom-up” perspective. These individual officers have insights into the timeliness of important information and the applicability of certain types of information to their overall duties. While the information may be available, it is important to understand how, when, and why, each individual officer accesses the information and how that information impacts their daily job duties. Without this insight and understanding information sharing will certainly fail. (Bransford, 2012)

Conversely, the IC members need to update their train of thought when sharing with LE entities. A congressional hearing in 2015, regarding IC information sharing with law-enforcement, notes there are still a large number of IC members whom do not look at law-enforcement as “partners”. The opening statements of this hearing imply there is a risk inherent to sharing information with a vast number of individuals (LE officers, or not). I tend to agree with this statement, as a general rule-of-thumb, each individual you add to a distro or secret program increases substantially the risk of spillage or leaks (HR, 2015). Unfortunately, I don’t think the risk inherent to sharing information will be solved in the near future. Therefore, the IC must accept this risk and attempt to mitigate without completely shutting out their LE partners.

My solution is two-fold. First, LE leadership must take the time to fully understand the IC and understand what programs, agencies, and personnel can assist in LE investigations. Leadership must involve their rank-and-file members and analysts when making this determination. All too often, leadership make decisions impacting low-level duties, without fully understanding the impact on daily officer performance. Second, IC leadership, beginning at the top, must emphasize the importance of sharing the requested information in a timely and accurate manner. IC leadership must stress to their rank-and-file members the importance of our LE partnerships and create an environment where the sharing of legal information is not only encouraged, but applauded. If IC leadership show a propensity to share information and develop these relationships, routine IC members will follow. Unfortunately, the IC, similar in many ways to the LE community, is a very close-knit group and stove piping of information is typically desired over open sharing. Changing this aspect of the culture will greatly enhance IC and LE integration.

Kyle

References:

Office of the Director of National Intelligence (ODNI). (n.d.). Law Enforcement Information Sharing. Retrieved January 18, 2020 https://rb.gy/yypo2e

Bransford, S. D. (2012). An Examination of Factors Affecting Information Sharing among Law Enforcement Agencies. Retrieved January 18, 2020 https://rb.gy/ipchyo

U.S. House of Representatives [HR]. (2015, February 26). Addressing Remaining Gaps in Federal, State, and Local Information Sharing. Retrieved January 18, 2020 https://rb.gy/stygdi

RESPONSE 2

Integration of the IC with Local LE Efforts

Class,

It can be argued that there has been a concerted effort, at least ostensibly, to integrate components of the IC into local level policing. Consider, for example, the use of fusion Centers and Joint Terrorism Task Forces. Fusion centers are centers that consist of multiple law enforcement agencies and other first responders on the federal, state, and local levels (Fusion Centers & JTTFs, 2016). The centers focus not only on terrorism, but also on criminal and public safety issues (Fusion Centers). Fusion centers are owned and operated by state and local authorities but also include private sector companies and tribal government (Fusion Centers & JTTFs, 2016). There are essentially two types of fusion centers. The first type of fusion center is known as a Primary Fusion Center (Fusion Centers & Contact Locations, 2020). Primary Fusion Centers are fusion centers that provide analysis and information sharing for an entire state and are the locations through which federal resources such as personnel are typically deployed (Fusion Centers & Contact Locations, 2020). The second type of fusion centers are called Recognized Fusion Centers (Fusion Centers & Contact Locations, 2020). This particular type of fusion center provides the same functions as the first type except that the functions are focused on a major urban area (Fusion Centers & Contact Locations, 2020). Essentially, any fusion center that is not designated as PFC will be designated as a RFC (Fusion Centers & Contact Locations, 2020).

JTTFs, on the other hand, focus more on the counter terrorism mission and are dedicated towards providing investigative support towards the fulfillment of that mission (Fusion Centers & Contact Locations, 2020). JTTFs are also managed by the FBI and combine an integrated multi-jurisdictional approach towards combating both domestic as well as international terrorism (Fusion Centers & Contact Locations, 2020). When both fusion centers and JTTFs work in tandem, they are able to leverage their information-sharing abilities and utilization of personnel on all levels of government (36383258“>Fusion Centers & Contact Locations, 2020). One example of the synergistic relationship between fusion centers and JTTFs is the 2013 case of the apprehension of an individual impersonating an ICE Special Agent (2013 Success Stores, 2019). Virginia Fusion Center became apprised of an individual impersonating an ICE Special Agent and conveyed the information to healthcare officials and law enforcement authorities including Homeland Security Investigations (HSI) (2013 Success Stores, 2019). The individual was eventually apprehended and charged with False Personation of an Employee of the United States (2013 Success Stores, 2019).

Additional law enforcement and intelligence community integration efforts could be realized, however, it can be argued that the cultural organization of agencies within the IC prevent such integration efforts from occurring. Consider, for example, that in the United States and prior to the attacks of 9/11, the traditional mindset that “spies are not cops” and vice versa had led to a culture in which the sharing of intelligence between law enforcement agencies such as the FBI and intelligence agencies such as the CIA was virtually non-existent (Hulnick, 2008). Apprehension about intelligence sharing existed between members of both camps primarily due to long-established organizational practices and partially due to varying degrees of distrust between the two groups (Hulnick, 2008). It was not until the events of September 11, 2001 that the two entities were forced to comprehend the value and effectiveness of interagency cooperation and attempt to carry out that objective for the purposes of improving homeland security (2008).

The cultural pathology of both the FBI and CIA, as Amy Zegart (2007) suggests, is that of isolationism and parochialism (Zegart, 2007). In this regard, the FBI is particularly susceptible because it is a law enforcement agency whose primary mission is to respond to crimes and secure convictions (Hulnick, 2008). With respect to the CIA, though it is tasked with preempting “threats and furthering US national security objectives by collecting intelligence that matters, producing objective all-source analysis”, and “conducting effective covert action as directed by the President…”, the existence of differing sub cultures each with its own identity and objectives within the agency as well as an ever increasing parochial system, overriding sense of security, and resistance to change, has caused the agency to be isolated (Zegart, 2007, p. 39). Despite the various organizational issues present in both agencies, both the FBI and CIA have been tasked with a similar role and mission post 9/11, which is that of prevention instead of reaction. The issue with this new role assignment as it concerns the FBI, however, is that the FBI is not designed to prevent crimes from occurring, but rather to react to them and prosecute the perpetrators of the crimes (Zegart, 2007). The two agencies represent two contrasting sides that in the post-9/11 era are being pressured to cooperate with one another though their original respective missions and natural tendencies have historically dictated that they execute their duties separately (Zegart, 2007).

One suggestion as to how LE and the IC could improve integration efforts is by the use of risk management as it pertains to the sharing of intelligence. What this means is that IC and LE professionals should weigh the risk of not sharing intelligence with sharing intelligence with the ultimate goal of “connecting the dots” especially as it pertains to preventing acts of terrorism or at least in the context of mitigating such acts (AFCEA, 2007). The goal should be to move away from the construct of data ownership and move towards the goal of sharing data, even if such data comes from unclassified sources as the usually the case on the local level (AFCEA, 2007). In addition to sharing data for the purpose of prevention or mitigation, IC and LE communities can benefit from discussing lessons learned as well as good ideas (AFCEA, 2007). In the early 1980s, for example, the DEA partnerships with local law enforcement enabled local police to learn common trafficking tactics utilized by South American drug cartels resulting in local police being able to better detect behavior and precursor chemicals associated with trafficking of narcotics (AFCEA, 2007).

Tari,

References

AFCEA International. (2007, April). The Need to Share: The U.S. Intelligence Community and Law …. Retrieved January 20, 2021, from https://www.afcea.org/mission/intel/documents/SpringIntel07whitepaper_000.pdf

Department of Homeland Security. (2019, August 5). 2013 Fusion Center Success Stories. Retrieved from https://www.dhs.gov/2013-fusion-center-success-stories

Department of Homeland Security. (2016, July 29). Fusion Centers and Joint Terrorism Task Forces.. Retrieved from https://www.dhs.gov/fusion-centers-and-joint-terrorism-task-forces

Hulnick, A. S. (2008). Intelligence and law enforcement: The “spies are not cops” problem. International Journal of Intelligence and Counterintelligence, 10(3), 269–286. doi: 10.1080/08850609708435350

Zegart, A. (2007). 9/11 and the FBI: The organizational roots of failure. Intelligence and National Security, 22(2), 165–184. doi: 10.1080/02684520701415123

RESPONSE 3

Mekcos Intial Discussion

Class,

Intelligence Community partnership with local law enforcement is well integrated. Communication ensures both agencies can effectively carry out their individual and shared national and homeland security responsibilities while working within their respective authorities. The IC and local law enforcement partners have made significant progress since 9/11 in building capacity, standardizing practices, and sharing information with domestic mission partners in the United States to defend against and respond to foreign and foreign-inspired threats to our homeland. Many threats to the U.S.—such as those posed by terrorists and transnational organized crime groups—transcend borders, making this type of cooperation a necessity (Intel.gov, 2020).

Texas is an overall military state containing 18 active military bases. The Intelligence Community and the military work hand-in-hand to keep our nation and our deployed troops safe. Each branch of the military has its own intelligence element, which is both part of the military and part of the IC. Together, these military and civilian IC elements collect strategic and tactical intelligence that supports military operations and planning, personnel security in war zones and elsewhere, and anti-terrorism efforts.

I recommend IC and LE start understanding the cultural differences between the intelligence and law enforcement communities, this is key to understanding the lack of progress. Pure law enforcement focuses on building a legal case related to a crime that already has been committed—an historical perspective with a forensic cast. A case is carefully constructed based on admissible evidence. The evidence is handled in a prescribed manner. The rules associated with chain-of-custody are designed to protect the integrity of information and reduce the pollution of evidence as much as possible (AFCEA, 2007). A set of procedures is followed precisely to ensure the case will be successfully prosecuted. In comparison, intelligence agencies often collect information in a way that is not admissible in a U.S. Court. Law enforcement agencies are traditionally reluctant to use such information because of the potential of it being challenged and thereby jeopardizing a case.

Meckos

Reference

Intel.gov (2020). How the IC works. Retrieved at;

https://www.intelligence.gov/how-the-ic-works

Military-Hotels.us (2021). Hotels and Motels near Texas Military Bases. Retrieved at;

https://military-hotels.us/texas/tx-bases.html

PRNewswire-USNewswire: Creation of New Information Sharing Steering Committee for the IntelligenceCommunity, Washington, March 6, 2007;

https://www.afcea.org/mission/intel/documents/spri…

RESPONSE 4

Integration of the IC with Local LE Efforts

Hello class!

Ever since the terrorist attack on America in 2001, killing and wounding thousands, there have been new initiatives implemented to ensure the chances of something like this happening again, diminish. As stated by Carter (2006), there were “a staggering number of significant developments affecting law enforcement intelligence have occurred.” These developments that were affecting our law enforcement capabilities immensely thus hindering the progress of information sharing and intelligence. Development of Fusion Centers were still in the initial stages of development and guidelines were non-existent (Carter, 2006). Fast forward from 2006 to 2018, “DHS has provided hundreds of personnel to support the 104 Joint Terrorism Task Forces (JTTF) across the country” (U.S. Department of Homeland Security, 2018). With the production of all of these JTTF’s, information sharing with local law enforcement is very robust. Programs such as Fusion Centers, various initiatives, the National Terrorism Advisory System (NTAS), and See Something, Say Something campaign are great ways to get information or intelligence flowing.

Local law enforcement and the Intelligence Community are more unified than ever right now with the bi-directional information flow. To remedy these information shortfalls, the 9/11 commission developed a “homeland security enterprise that shares information across traditional organizational boundaries” (U.S. Department of Homeland Security, 2018). It was because of this lack of sharing information, we now have a large network of Fusion Centers and other places to spread information.

As far as considerations go, the intelligence community might benefit from more training. But, it also goes back to the point that it is hard to change a person’s view. “The weak standards around SAR (Suspicious Activity Reporting) are particularly concerning because of the way they can lead to racial and religious profiling” (Kayyali, 2014). Once a SAR has been initiated, then local law enforcement biased comes into play as well. I think more careful consideration needs to happen before the SAR is acted upon and/or training needs to take place to lower occurrences.

v/r,

Tack,

References:

Carter, D. (2006). Law enforcement intelligence: A guide for state, local, and tribal law enforcement agencies. Retrieved January 20, 2021, from U.S. Department of Justice Office of Community Oriented Policing Services: 050919201-IntelGuide_web.pdf”>https://it.ojp.gov/documents/d/e050919201-IntelGui…

Kayyali, D. (2014, April 07). Why Fusion Centers Matter: FAQ. Retrieved January 20, 2021, from Electronic Frontier Foundation: https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2014/04/why-fusion-centers-matter-faq#:~:text=There%20are%2078%20recognized%20fusion,Department%20of%20Homeland%20Security%20personnel.

U.S. Department of Homeland Security. (2018, August 14). Information Sharing. Retrieved January 20, 2021, from U.S. Department of Homeland Security: https://www.dhs.gov/information-sharing

_________________________________________________________________________________________Module 3 – Background

THE U.S. INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY RELATIONSHIPS WITH LAW ENFORCEMENT AGENCIES

Required Reading

Carter, D.L. (2006). Law enforcement intelligence: A guide for state, local, and tribal law enforcement agencies. Washington, D.C.: U.S. Department of Justice Office of Community Oriented Policing Services. Retrieved from 050919201-IntelGuide_web.pdf” target=”_blank”>050919201-IntelGuide_web.pdf”>https://it.ojp.gov/documents/d/e050919201-IntelGui…

Grassley, C. (2013). Intelligence sharing in wake of Boston marathon bombings. Prepared Floor Statement of Senator Chuck Grassley of Iowa, Ranking Member, Senate Judiciary Committee. Washington, DC: Office of Senator Grassley. Retrieved from ProQuest.

Kredo, A. (2013). Failure to communicate: Intelligence sharing could have helped prevent Boston marathon bombing. The Washington Free Beacon. Retrieved from http://freebeacon.com/national-security/failure-to…

N.A. (2009). LEAP: Law Enforcement Assistance and Partnership Strategy. Washington, DC: Office of Congressman Bennie Thompson. Retrieved from http://epic.org/privacy/fusion/leap.pdf

Mueller, R. (2001). Address to the 108th annual conference of the international association of chiefs of police. Retrieved from http://www.fbi.gov/news/speeches/law-enforcement-c…

U.S. Government (2004). Intelligence reform and terrorism prevention act of 2004. Retrieved from http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/PLAW-108publ458/pdf/P…

National Counterterrorism Center. VIDEO: About the National Counterterrorism Center. Retrieved from http://www.nctc.gov/